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CONTENT AND CONTEXT: THE 
CONTRIBUTIONS OF WILLIAM VAN ALSTYNE 
TO FIRST AMENDMENT INTERPRETATION 
RODNEY A. SMOLLA† 
INTRODUCTION 
William Van Alstyne’s contributions to First Amendment 
interpretation, like his contributions to all of American constitutional 
law, are characterized by a piercing intellectual honesty and an impish 
play of intelligence. One feels relentlessly pulled by the elegant 
currents of Professor Van Alsytne’s arguments, yet, at the same time, 
restlessly resistant, a resistance borne of the vague but certain 
wariness that one is but an apprentice forever consigned to a level of 
awareness several moves behind the master, who almost certainly will 
produce surprises at the end. 
In this essay I explore two defining themes of Professor Van 
Alsytne’s First Amendment thought, themes that occupy cornerstone 
placements in the modern architecture of First Amendment law. The 
first theme deals with the core content of the First Amendment’s 
Speech Clause.1 The second theme deals with the vexing problem of 
how to interpret the Speech Clause in the context of the 
government’s putative participation in the expressive enterprise. 
In the parlance of Professor Van Alsytne’s scholarship, Part I of 
this essay searches for the meaning of the First Amendment’s phrase 
“the freedom of speech,” with an emphasis on “the.”2 This 
exploration includes an examination of the shortcomings of 
“absolutism” as a plausible understanding of the meaning of “the 
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 1. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the fre edom of 
speech . . . .”). 
 2. WILLIAM VAN ALSTYNE, INTERPRETATIONS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 25 (1984).  
012306 07_SMOLLA.DOC 2/6/2006   10:21 AM 
1624 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 54:1623 
freedom of speech,”3 an examination of why the history surrounding 
the enactment of the First Amendment, including the elusive search 
for the “original understanding” of the First Amendment, is only of 
limited utility in supplying doctrinal content to the Free Speech 
Clause.4 Part I concludes with a critique of the various attempts that 
have been made to reduce the meaning of the Free Speech Clause to 
some formulaic calculation. These calculations include the “bad 
tendency” test;5 the “clear and present danger” test;6 Judge Learned 
Hand’s risk calculation test, embraced for a time by the Supreme 
Court in Dennis v. United States;7 and the currently prevailing 
orthodoxy, the “incitement test” articulated in Brandenburg v. Ohio,8 
as well as various “categorical” approaches to free speech law, such as 
that suggested by the Court in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire.9 
 
 3. See infra Part I.A. 
 4. See infra Part I.B. 
 5. See infra notes 68–72 and accompanying text. The “bad tendency” test is most famously 
associated with the early free speech opinions of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, before Holmes 
shifted to positions more protective of freedom of speech. See Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 
211, 216 (1919) (“[T]he jury were [sic] most carefully instructed that they could not find the 
defendant guilty for advocacy of any of his opinions unless the words used had as their natural 
tendency . . . to obstruct the recruiting service . . . .”); Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 
209 (1919) (concluding that a speaker may be punished for knowingly making statements that 
tend to “kindle a flame” of dissent in the audience); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 
(1919) (“If the act,  . . . its tendency[,] and the intent with which it is done are the same, we 
perceive no ground for saying that success alone warrants making the act a crime.”). Under this 
test, the mere “tendency” of speech to cause harm was enough to justify its regulation. Ernst 
Freund, The Debs Case and Freedom of Speech , 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 239, 239 (1973);  David M. 
Rabban, The First Amendment in Its Forgotten Years, 90 YALE L.J. 514, 533 (1981).  
 6. See infra  notes 73–79 and accompanying text. 
 7. 341 U.S. 494 (1951). “In each case [courts] must ask whether the gravity of the ‘evil,’ 
discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the 
danger.” Id. at 510 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 
(2d Cir. 1950)); see infra  notes 80–83 and accompanying text. Professor Van Alstyne critiques 
the Hand / Dennis formula in Interpretations of the First Amendment. VAN ALSTYNE, supra 
note 2, at 30–37. 
 8. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).  
[T]he constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to 
forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such 
advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to 
incite or produce such action. 
Id. at 447; see infra  notes 84–85 and accompanying text. Professor Van Alstyne discusses the 
Brandenburg  formula in Interpretations of the First Amendment. VAN ALSTYNE, supra  note 2,  
at 35. 
 9. 315 U.S. 568 (1942); id. at 571–72 (discussing forms of speech that do not receive First 
Amendment protection); see infra  notes 86–112 and accompanying text. 
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Modern free speech doctrine takes in a vast landscape. The table 
of contents of Professor Van Alstyne’s law school casebook on the 
First Amendment illustrates the point.10 The topics covered by the 
casebook include taxation of the press, regulation of the political 
process, campaign finance laws, libel law, privacy law, symbolic 
dissent, prior restraints, regulation of speech in relation to the judicial 
process, the speech of government employees, public forum law, 
regulation of broadcasting, coerced expression, anonymity and 
freedom of expression, commercial speech, press access to judicial 
proceedings, and obscenity11—and these topics, numerous as they are, 
do not include all that exist (lest the casebook become so thick as to 
lose its pedagogical utility and market viability). 
Tests such as “clear and present danger” or the Brandenburg 
incitement standard may be perfectly serviceable when dealing with a 
prosecution for incitement to riot, but they tend to lose their 
coherence when applied to such issues as libel, public forum law, or 
campaign finance restrictions. In modern First Amendment doctrine, 
one size does not fit all, at least not stylishly. As Professor Van 
Alstyne’s scholarly efforts have so well de monstrated, the intelligent 
design of free speech doctrine must be a constant work-in-progress, 
continually refined to remain robustly protective of free speech. 
Part I of this essay examines Professor Van Alsytne ’s wonderful 
insights into the intricacies of any conscientious attempt to define the 
appropriate core content of “the freedom of speech,” with particular 
emphasis on the strengths and weaknesses of such approaches as 
absolutism, historicism, and formulaic standards. Part I examines 
Professor Van Alsytne’s important contributions to the ongoing 
constitutional conversation on the meaning of the First Amendment, 
and offers in turn a few modest ruminations on that conversation. 
In Part II, I explore a second theme of Professor Van Alstyne ’s 
scholarship, one that centers less on content and more on context in 
First Amendment analysis. This Part focuses specifically on one of the 
great perplexing questions of modern First Amendment law: To what 
extent are First Amendment protections appropriately diminished or 
diluted when the government itself is in some way a putative 
participant in the expressive activity? I use the term “putative 
participant” here purposefully—for whether the government is a 
 
 10. WILLIAM W. VAN ALSTYNE, FIRST AMENDMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS xi–xvi (2d 
ed. 1995). 
 11. Id. 
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genuine participant is often a critical issue in contest, as is the degree 
and nature of that participation.12 Indeed, a careful dissection of the 
claimed participation is often warranted, with the degree of 
protection derived through analysis of the precise nature of the 
government’s participation.13 This problem of the “government as 
participant” arises in modern First Amendment law in many different 
iterations, ranging from issues posed by the regulation of speech on 
government property or in a government facility (an issue usually 
treated as part of “public forum” law14), to situations in which the 
speech takes place in the context of some governmental enterprise 
(such as public education, public employment, or the management of 
a prison system15), to speech by government licensees in regulated 
industries (such as the  regulation of broadcasting by the Federal 
Communications Commission16), to speech that is subsidized in whole 
or in part by government funding (such as student publications at a 
state university17 or funding of the arts18), to the direct expressive 
activity of the government itself, such as an antismoking campaign 
(so-called “government speech”19). In Part II, I explore how attempts 
 
 12. See generally id. at 330–33; see infra note 166 and accompanying text. 
 13. See generally VAN ALSTYNE, supra note 10, at 330–33; see infra Parts II.B & C. 
 14. See generally VAN ALSTYNE, supra note 10, at 480–552; see infra Part II.B. 
 15. See generally VAN ALSTYNE, supra note 10, at 336–420; see infra Part II.C. 
 16. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 369, 375 (1969) (rejecting broadcasters’ 
First Amendment challenge to the FCC’s “fairness doctrine” requiring broadcasters to cover 
both sides of public issues); VAN ALSTYNE, supra note 10, at 536–47 (discussing Red Lion and 
regulation of the airwaves). 
 17. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 825, 837 (1995) 
(holding that a university policy of denying funding to any student group that “primarily 
promotes or manifests a particular belie[f] in or about a deity or an ultimate reality” infringes 
the right to free speech (alteration in original) (quoting Appendix to Petition for Certiorari at 
66a)). 
 18. See Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 573 (1998) (rejecting a First 
Amendment challenge to the statutory requirement that the National Endowment for the Arts, 
in assessing the artistic merit of grant applications, “tak[e] into consideration general standards 
of decency and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the American public” (alteration in 
original) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 954(d)(1))). 
 19. See, e.g., Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541 (2001) (“[V]iewpoint-based 
funding decisions can be sustained in instances in which the government is itself the speaker.”); 
Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 229 (2000) (“It is 
inevitable that government will adopt and pursue programs and policies within its constitutional 
powers but which nevertheless are contrary to the profound beliefs and sincere convictions of 
some of its citizens.”); Planned Parenthood of S.C. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786, 794 (4th Cir. 2004) 
(Michael, J., writing separately and announcing the judgment) (concluding that a license plate 
bearing the slogan “Choose Life” constitutes a mixture of government and private speech), cert. 
denied, 125 S. Ct. 1036 (2005); id. at 800 (Luttig, J., concurring) (same); Sons of Confederate 
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to grapple with the problems posed by the government-as-putative-
participant in speech usually trigger forays into one of the larger 
quandaries of American constitutional law, the “right-privilege” 
distinction, and its doctrinal antidote, the “doctrine of 
unconstitutional conditions.”20 The direction of American 
constitutional law on this right-privilege issue has been heavily 
influenced by William Van Alstyne ’s writings.21 
I.  THE CORE CONTENT OF THE 
SPEECH CLAUSE: THE FREEDOM OF SPEECH 
One of my favorite episodes in modern American libel litigation 
arose from a breezy interview of the writer Mary McCarthy on the 
old Dick Cavett show, in which McCarthy was slinging literary slams 
against other writers, including Lillian Hellman. Among her zings was 
the insult that “every word she writes is a lie, including ‘and’ and 
‘the.’”22 Hellman sued McCarthy for libel and appropriately lost.23 
The essential relevancy of this seemingly inessential irrelevancy, 
however, is the nice illustration of the degree to which little words, 
even the lowly “the,” may at times pack big importance. 
A. Why the First Amendment Cannot be an Absolute 
William Van Alstyne uses a combination of the “the” in the 
Speech Clause and a series of what he calls “irresistible 
counterexamples” to illustrate why, as a matter of both constitutional 
 
Veterans, Inc. v. Comm’r of Va. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 288 F.3d 610, 621 (4th Cir. 2002) 
(concluding that a Sons of Confederate Veterans license plate featuring a Confederate flag 
constitutes private speech); see infra note 166 and accompanying text. 
 20. See VAN ALSTYNE, supra note 10, at 330–78 (discussing the right-privilege distinction 
and the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions); see infra Part II.A. 
 21. Van Alstyne’s works on this topic include VAN ALSTYNE, supra note 10, at 330–34; 
William Van Alstyne, Cracks in “The New Property”: Adjudicative Due Process in the 
Administrative State, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 445, 485–87 (1977) [hereinafter Van Alstyne, New 
Property]; William W. Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in 
Constitutional Law , 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439, 1461–62 (1968) [hereinafter Van Alstyne, Right-
Privilege Distinction]; see infra Part II.A. 
 22. Hellman v. McCarthy, 10 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1789, 1790 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984), 
discussed in RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SUING THE PRESS 62–66 (1986). 
 23. SMOLLA, supra note 22, at 62–66. 
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text and common logic, the First Amendment cannot be sensibly 
interpreted as providing absolute protection for freedom of speech.24 
The actual constitutional text, of which we ought never tire, 
bears repeating: “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the 
freedom of speech . . . .”25 We may properly thank Professor Van 
Alstyne for reminding us, at the threshold, that this command is 
relatively unique among constitutional guarantees in its lack of 
condition or equivocation.26 Unlike the Fourth Amendment, it is not 
limited to “unreasonable” actions by government, as in the case of the 
prohibition against “unreasonable searches and seizures.”27 Similarly, 
unlike the Fifth Amendment, it is not trimmed by requiring that 
government provide only that “process” which is “due.”28 And unlike 
the Eighth Amendment, it is not confined to punishments that are 
“excessive,” “cruel,” or “unusual.”29 
The command of the First Amendment is, by comparison to 
other guarantees, ostensibly absolute. And there have been jurists 
who have insisted on absolute fidelity to its language. Justice Black 
would thus sternly invoke the First Amendment’s clarion command 
that “Congress shall make no law” abridging freedom of speech as a 
literal translation of a sacred text, employing a kind of First 
Amendment version of scriptural fundamentalism, in which the words 
“no law” were understood quite literally as no law, “without any ifs, 
buts, or whereases.”30 Echoing his Brother’s theme, Justice Douglas 
often concurred in similarly soaring invocations, such as his statement 
in Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National 
 
 24. See VAN ALSTYNE, supra note 2, at 22–26 (suggesting that speech such as soliciting 
murder and threatening the president would not fall within the “the” in “the freedom of 
speech”). 
 25. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 26. See VAN ALSTYNE, supra  note 2, at 22 (“In comparison with nearly every other 
provision in the Bill of Rights, the first amendment is of exceptional crispness and clarity.”). 
 27. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 28. U.S. CONST. amend. V; see, e.g., Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332–49 (1976) 
(employing a cost-benefit analysis to determine levels of procedural protection that apply to 
deprivations of interests in “‘liberty’ or ‘property’”  in context of administrative action (quoting 
U.S. CONST. amend. V, XIV)). 
 29. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 30. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 275 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting); Edmond Cahn, 
Justice Black and First Amendment “Absolutes”: A Public Interview, 37 N.Y.U.  L. REV. 549, 559 
(1952) (“My view is . . . without any ifs, buts or whereases, that freedom of speech means that 
you shall not do something to people either for the views they have or the views they express or 
the words they speak or write.” (remarks of Justice Black)). 
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Committee31 that “[t]he ban of ‘no’ law that abridges freedom of the 
press is in my view total and complete.”32 
Through a parade of “irresistible counterexamples,” Professor 
Van Alstyne demonstrates an intuitive recognition that many 
instances of communication that fall literally within the meaning of 
the word “speech” in the First Amendment cannot plausibly be 
understood to dwell within the shelter of the constitutional command 
protecting “the freedom of speech.”33 
Professor Van Alstyne begins with the best-known of all such 
counterexamples, the argument of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes 
that no credible conception of the meaning of the Free Speech Clause 
will include within its protection the case of a person shouting “Fire!” 
in a crowded theater—knowing there is no fire—for the perverse 
purpose of precipitating a stampede.34 Holmes’ example is so often 
quoted that it now verges on cultural cliché.35 
Yet, to illustrate the convolution of modern First Amendment 
law, even the irresistible counterexamples may be subjected to 
irresistible counter-counterexamples. Pushing the problem in his 
inimitably puckish way, for example, Van Alstyne devilishly posits 
the problem of a diabolical villain who shouts “Fire!” in a crowded 
theater populated entirely by persons who are deaf, watching a movie 
with subtitles!36 
Taking a cue from Van Alstyne ’s clever play on the Holmes 
counterexample, I offer some plays of my own. In the midst of debate 
over the meaning of “the freedom of speech,” someone will inevitably 
declare that it does not encompass any right to shout “Fire!” in a 
crowded theater. But of course, it does, if there is a fire. And of 
course, the observation by Holmes does not solve many subsidiary 
difficulties, such as what society’s response ought to be when the 
person who shouts “Fire!” thinks there is one but turns out to be 
 
 31. 412 U.S. 94 (1973). 
 32. Id. at 156 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 33. VAN ALSTYNE, supra  note 2, at 22–26. 
 34. Id. at 24; see Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (Holmes, J.) (“The most 
stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theater 
and causing a panic.”). 
 35. RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 98–108 (1992) (explaining 
the development of free speech jurisprudence, including Holmes’ “fire” quote); see Gerald 
Caplan, Searching for Holmes Among the Biographers, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 769, 770–71 n.4 
(2002) (commenting on the pervasiveness of Holmes’s images in federal court opinions). 
 36. VAN ALSTYNE, supra  note 2, at 38. 
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mistaken. May strict liability attach to render the shouter responsible 
for ensuing harm?37 Should negligence be the operative principle?38 
Or is a standard more protective of such speech warranted, something 
similar to “reckless disregard” for the risks of harm?39 And recalling 
that when Holmes made this observation he was putting it to the 
service of a discussion of liability for antiwar protest and draft 
obstruction, the metaphor of “fire” and “crowded theater” also 
invites judgment as to whether expression of opinion may be 
penalized.40 If the shout of “fire” is an argument that launching a war 
 
 37. One might, for example, treat the shouting of “Fire!” in a crowded theater as a kind of 
intramural exercise of speech not part of the arena of public discourse implicating any issue of 
public concern, and thus essentially beneath the radar of the First Amendment. See Dun & 
Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 759–60 (1985) (raising the possibility 
that common-law strict liability standards for defamation may be constitutionally permissible 
when the attempt to impose liability does not involve any issue of “public concern”). There is 
authority for the proposition that the First Amendment might permit strict liability standards to 
apply in defamation actions not involving public figure plaintiffs or issues of public concern. 
Sleem v. Yale Univ., 843 F. Supp. 57, 62 (M.D.N.C. 1993); Ross v. Bricker, 770 F. Supp. 1038, 
1043 (D.V.I. 1991); Pearce v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 664 F. Supp. 1490, 1505 n.21 (D.D.C. 
1987); RODNEY A. SMOLLA, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION § 3:17 (2d ed. 2004); see also Snead v. 
Redland Aggregates, Ltd., 998 F.2d 1325, 1333 (5th Cir. 1993) (stating that Dun & Bradstreet 
exempts states from First Amendment strictures in defamation actions when speech does not 
relate to matters of public concern); Mutafis v. Erie Ins. Exch., 775 F.2d 593, 594–95 (4th Cir. 
1985) (holding that under Dun & Bradstreet no First Amendment principles attached to speech 
arising from an interoffice memorandum not related to issues of public concern). 
 38. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974) (holding that ordinary 
negligence is the minimum First Amendment standard required of states for the imposition of 
liability in defamation cases in which the plaintiff is a private figure). 
 39. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964) (establishing standard 
of “knowledge that [a statement] was false or with reckless disregard of whether [a statement] 
was false or not” in public official defamation cases). 
 40. Separating “fact” from “opinion,” and determining the extent to which the First 
Amendment ought to be understood as speaking to this issue, has been a vexing issue. The 
question has had a rollercoaster history, for example, in First Amendment cases dealing with 
defamation standards. The starting point for analysis is the holding of the United States 
Supreme Court in its landmark decision in Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co. , 497 U.S. 1 (1990). 
Prior to Milkovich, there was a spreading consensus among lower courts that the First 
Amendment contained a freestanding constitutional protection for statements of opinion in 
defamation actions. This constitutional protection of opinion was seen as superseding and 
augmenting the protections embodied in the “fair comment” privilege recognized at common 
law. The basis of this belie f was traced most famously to language in Gertz , in which the 
Supreme Court stated with seemingly emphatic certitude that “[u]nder the First Amendment 
there is no such thing as a false idea. However pe rnicious an opinion may seem, we depend for 
its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas.” 
418 U.S. at 339–40. Building on this pronouncement in Gertz, as well as other statements from 
the Supreme Court protecting “rhetorical hyperbole,” Greenbelt Coop. Publ. Assoc. v. Bresler, 
398 U.S. 6, 14 (1970), “lusty and imaginative expression of contempt,” Old Dominion Branch 
No. 496, Nat’l Assoc. of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 286 (1974), or vicious parody, 
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against Iraq in the absence of transparent and public documentation 
of weapons of mass destruction, and the “crowded theater” is 
something akin to the “theater of war against terrorism,” then 
whether there is a “fire” and a “war” in the constitutional sense may 
both be matters of contingent characterization on which reasonable 
and loyal citizens are permitted to disagree.41 
Professor Van Alstyne poses many other irresistible 
counterexamples, all of which reinforce his general premise—that 
each counterexample is “an instance of speech plainly within the 
literal protection of the first amendment but an instance nonetheless 
sufficient to give one pause.”42 For each such irresistible 
counterexample posited by Professor Van Alstyne, one might cite 
examples recognized by the courts confirming the common sense 
“pause” indicating that the First Amendment simply cannot be 
understood as absolute. This overlap of Professor Van Alstyne’s 
counterexamples and judicial decisions limiting free speech include 
solicitation of murder,43 bribery of a public official,44 false and 
 
Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55 (1988), lower courts not only treated opinion as 
independently protected by the First Amendment, but constructed various multi-part doctrinal 
tests to define “opinion” generously. These judicial decisions tended to emphasize such factors 
as (1) the author’s choice of words, (2) whether the cha llenged statement is capable of being 
objectively characterized as true or false, (3) the context of the challenged statement within the 
writing or speech as a whole, and (4) the broader social context into which the statement fits. 
See, e.g., Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 983 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc) (emphasizing these four 
factors). The Supreme Court’s decision in Milkovich, however, complicated this picture. In 
Milkovich the Court held that there is no freestanding First Amendment privilege protecting 
“opinion” in defamation suits. 497 U.S. at 19–20. Yet at the same time, the Supreme Court in 
Milkovich held that in defamation suits against media defendants involving stories on issues on 
“matters of public concern,” the First Amendment requires that the defamatory statement, 
whether express or implied, be provable as false before there can be liability. See id. at 20 (“The 
question is not whether a statement is an opinion, but whether a reasonable factfinder could 
conclude that the statement implies an assertion of fact that is provable as false.”). 
 41. See Rodney A. Smolla, Not So Free Speech, LEGAL AFF., Jan.-Feb. 2005, at 62–66 
(reviewing GEOFFREY STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME FROM THE 
SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM (2005)). 
 42. VAN ALSTYNE, supra  note 2, at 24. 
 43. Id. at 24; see also Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 627 (1919) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting): 
I do not doubt for a moment that by the same reasoning that would justify punishing 
persuasion to murder, the United States constitutionally may punish speech that 
produces or is intended to produce a clear and imminent danger that it will bring 
about forthwith certain substantive evils that the United States constitutionally may 
seek to prevent. 
For another case discussing free speech and solicitation of murder, see Rice v. Paladin 
Enterprises, Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 243 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that the First Amendment does not 
012306 07_SMOLLA.DOC 2/6/2006   10:21 AM 
1632 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 54:1623 
misleading commercial advertising,45 perjury,46 disruption of public 
meetings by interrupting the speech of someone else who has already 
been granted the floor,47 and a threat against the life of the 
president.48 
Absolutism has thus failed to carry the day, largely because it is 
simply too brittle to account for the many “irresistible 
counterexamples” for which some accounting must be made. A 
simplistic and entirely unsatisfying accommodation, advanced by 
Justice Black, was to label with the conclusory epithet “conduct” any 
form of expression that Justice Black deemed unworthy. This 
 
bar imposition of liability against publisher of a murder instruction manual when the manual 
was used by a professional hit man to perform contract murder for hire). 
 44. VAN ALSTYNE, supra  note 2, at 24; see also FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign 
Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 446 (2001) (assuming the constitutionality of antibribery laws); Buckley v. 
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 27 (1976) (recognizing the government’s interest in preventing “quid pro 
quo” donations). 
 45. VAN ALSTYNE, supra  note 2, at 24–25. Contemporary commercial speech doctrine is 
governed by the four-part test first articulated in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public 
Service Commission, 447 U.S. 557, 563–64 (1980): 
At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected by the First 
Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least must 
concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted 
governme ntal interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must 
determine whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest 
asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest. 
A large and contentious body of law has arisen regarding the nature of the proof required to 
satisfy the threshold Central Hudson requirement that the speech not be “misleading.” The 
issue was presented by Nike, Inc. v. Kasky , 539 U.S. 654 (2003), in which the Supreme Court 
ultimately refused to consider what First Amendment standards ought to apply to allegedly 
misleading statements by the corporate giant Nike regarding its employment practices in third-
world nations, see id. at 656 (Stevens, J., concurring). The California Supreme Court had 
sustained liability against Nike. Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 262 (Cal. 2002). The Supreme 
Court granted review, to great fanfare, only to dismiss the writ of certiorari as “improvidently 
granted.” Nike, 539 U.S. at 655. 
 46. VAN ALSTYNE, supra  note 2, at  25; see also Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 
36, 49 n.10 (1961) (explicitly rejecting the absolutist view of the meaning of the First 
Amendment and observing that such a view “of course cannot be reconciled with the law 
relating to libel, slander, misrepresentation, obscenity, perjury, false advertising, solicitation of 
crime, complicity by encouragement, conspiracy, and the like.”). 
 47. VAN ALSTYNE, supra note 2, at 25; see also State v. Hardin, 498 N.W.2d 677, 681 (Iowa 
1993) (holding that the First Amendment did not give a person a right to disrupt President Bush 
at a political fundraiser).  
 48. VAN ALSTYNE, supra  note 2, at 25; see Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358–59 (2003) 
(exploring the meaning of the  “true threat” doctrine under the First Amendment in the context 
of a challenge to Virginia’s anti-cross-burning statute); Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 
(1969) (exploring the meaning of the  “true threat” doctrine in the  context of prosecution under 
federal law criminalizing threats against the president, in a case in which the ostensible threat 
was deemed mere political hyperbole).  
012306 07_SMOLLA.DOC 2/6/2006   10:21 AM 
2005] FIRST AMENDMENT INTERPRETATION 1633 
expression could include activity that is undeniably expressive and 
also undeniably political, and thus (one might expect) at least 
presumptively protected. Justice Black thus dissented, voting against 
providing First Amendment protection for the expression, in the 
famous “Fuck the Draft” case, Cohen v. California,49 explaining that 
in wearing his offending jacket as a protest against the War in 
Vietnam, Paul Cohen was engaged, not in speech, but in conduct.50 
Yet Mr. Cohen’s message was manifestly metaphorical, as one cannot 
literally perform a sexual act with a federal agency. Similarly, in 
Adderley v. Florida ,51 Justice Black voted against First Amendment 
protection for civil rights protestors picketing outside a courthouse, 
again reasoning that the law was restricting conduct, not speech.52 In 
both cases Justice Black was dealing with protest that heavily relied 
upon the symbolic use of expression. Although it may well be that 
when expressive activity is brigaded with action or intertwined with 
physical conduct the government may have especially cogent claims 
for regulating certain aspects of the activity for reasons unrelated to 
the suppression of ideas or the content of the communication,53 the 
mere surface labeling of speech that has been deemed undesirable as 
conduct cannot be enough to take the government off the hook. 
B. Why History is not a Reliable Guide 
When absolutes fail, history is a tempting substitute. Interpreting 
a clause in the Constitution’s text in light of the original 
understanding of the clause may indeed supply a tempting certitude 
and legitimacy. Professor Van Alstyne, however, has not attempted to 
ground his approach to First Amendment interpretation in the 
original understanding of the Framers, and for good reason. The 
restricting reality of the First Amendment (and of numerous other 
grandly phrased clauses in the Constitution) is that history does not 
easily yield its secrets. 
 
 49. 403 U.S. 15 (1971). 
 50. Id. at 27 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (relying on the speech/conduct distinction in a 
dissenting opinion joined by Justice Black).  
 51. 385 U.S. 39 (1966). 
 52. Id. at 42. 
 53. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 803 (1989) (upholding an anti-noise 
regulation); United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 372 (1968) (upholding a ban on burning 
draft cards because of the government’s interest in preserving an administrative system). 
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As a matter of surface impression, what history seems to make of 
the First Amendment is that the Amendment did not mean much. 
The text of the Constitution refers only to “Congress,” and 
commands merely that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the 
freedom of speech.” Grammar would thus both permit and arguably 
invite the understanding that the First Amendment, by targeting only 
Congress, was applicable only to abridgements of a uniquely federal 
character, or, at the very most, limited to the common-law prohibition 
against prior restraints.54 In one of his earliest iterations of the 
meaning of the First Amendment, for example, Justice Holmes held 
in Patterson v. Colorado55 that a newspaper publisher could be jailed 
for contempt for daring to criticize the Colorado Supreme Court.56 
Throughout Holmes’ ruling in Patterson, Holmes casts doubt on the 
notion that the First Amendment applied to acts of state government 
at all.57 Even if the First Amendment did apply to Colorado, on the 
supposition that some notion of “freedom of speech” was implicit in 
the conceptions of liberty recited in the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, Holmes suggested that the meaning of the 
First Amendment was limited to the prevention of prior restraint.58 
Holmes would come to abandon this narrow view, and indeed, to 
abandon any effort to ground his First Amendment thought in 
history.59 Following Holmes, the development of modern First 
Amendment law has been largely ahistorical. The principal difficulty 
 
 54. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *151–52 (“The liberty of the press . . . 
consists in laying no previous restraints upon publication . . . .”). 
 55. 205 U.S. 454 (1907) (Holmes, J.).  
 56. See id. at 462 (holding that the First Amendment’s main purpose is to shield against 
prior restraints). 
 57. See id. at 460 (suggesting that the “Fourteenth Amendment would not forbid” certain 
intrusions by states into federal constitutional rights). 
 58. See id. at 462: 
But even if we were to assume that freedom of speech and freedom of the press were 
protected from abridgments on the part not only of the United States but also of the 
States, still we should be far from the conclusion that the plaintiff in error would have 
us reach. In the first place, the main purpose of such constitutional provisions is “to 
prevent all such previous restraints upon publications as had been practiced by other 
governments,” and they do not prevent the subsequent punishment of such as may be 
deemed contrary to the public welfare. The preliminary freedom extends as well to 
the false as to the true; the subsequent punishment may extend as well to the true as 
to the false. This was the law of criminal libel apart from statute in most cases, if not 
in all. 
(footnotes omitted). 
 59. See Rabban, supra note 5, at 591 (stating that Holmes, along with Brandeis, departed 
from historical interpretations of the First Amendment and developed a theory of the 
Amendment based on the writings of Zechariah Chafee, Jr.).  
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with any effort to liquidate the meaning of the First Amendment 
through reference to the original understanding of the Framers is 
that, among those select Framers who thought about the matter at all, 
different Framers thought different things.60 James Wilson articulated 
the meaning of the Amendment in Blackstonian terms, observing that 
“what is meant by the liberty of the press is, that there should be no 
antecedent restraint upon it; but that every author is responsible 
when he attacks the security or welfare of the government or the 
safety, character and property of the individual.”61 James Madison, 
however, explained the First Amendment by contrasting its 
protection with the British tradition,62 and would come to refer to 
freedom of the press as among the “essential” “rights of Conscience 
in the fullest latitude.”63 
Crabbed historicism also suffers from any lack of sensitivity to 
the larger arc of history that defined the American Revolution. The 
single most important historical datum regarding the Revolution is 
that it was a revolution, in which conceptions of government were in 
the process of radical and wholesale modification.64 The rebellious 
assumptions of the new nation were that ultimate sovereignty rested 
with the people, that legitimacy was dependent on the consent of the 
governed, and that expansive conceptions of liberty were 
fundamental to the nature of men. The Framers lived and breathed 
freedom of speech, and, in choosing such ringing and unqualified 
phrasing, it is doubtful that they intended future generations to be 
bound by any narrow English conceptions of what “the freedom of 
speech” should come to mean. 
C. The Formulas and Graphics of First Amendment Protection 
Professor Van Alstyne, like Holmes before him, thus wisely 
eschews absolutes, as well as any strong reliance on history as a guide 
 
 60. See David M. Rabban, The Ahistorical Historian: Leonard Levy on Freedom of 
Expression in Early American History , 37 STAN. L. REV. 795, 816–20 (1985) (reviewing 
LEONARD LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS (1985)) (discussing the divergent views of the 
Framers regarding free speech). 
 61. See HERBERT J. STORING, WHAT THE ANTI -FEDERALISTS WERE FOR 97 n.6 (1981). 
 62. See James Madison, Report on the Virginia Resolutions, 1798, in 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES 
528 (2d ed. 1941) (decrying the Alien and Sedition Acts as akin to monarchy). 
 63. 5 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 320 (G. Hunt ed. 1904). 
 64. See Rabban, supra note 60, at 855 (“[A] new conception of popular sovereignty, 
derived from the Radical Whig tradition in England, arose during the American 
Revolution . . . .”). 
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to interpreting the First Amendment. But if absolutes won’t do, and 
history cannot help, what principles ought to guide First Amendment 
jurisprudence? Rather than manufacture an elegant theory of First 
Amendment interpretation out of philosophical whole cloth, 
Professor Van Alstyne, following the method characteristic of all his 
constitutional scholarship, instead takes up the classic tools of the 
trade, and from them constructs his model.65 Professor Van Alstyne 
closely examines the cases, and the various doctrinal formulas and 
animating principles that emerge from them, relentlessly critiquing, 
contrasting, and comparing. Among my favorite examples of 
Professor Van Alstyne ’s labors in this regard is his essay “A Graphic 
Review of the Free Speech Clause.”66 Using diagrams and charts to 
illustrate graphically how various doctrinal approaches to First 
Amendment law operate, Professor Van Alstyne steadily and 
inexorably builds toward the extraction of guiding maxims for hardy 
and robust constitutional protection for speech. Professor Van 
Alstyne’s graphic tour of the First Amendment invites a survey of 
such nominees as the “bad tendency” test; “clear and present 
danger”; the Hand / Dennis test; and the modern variation of “clear 
and present danger,” the Brandenburg incitement test, as well as 
“categorical” approaches to First Amendment interpretation.67 
1. Bad Tendency. Modern free speech law started with a false 
start. In Schenck v. United States,68 Holmes announced his famous 
“clear and present danger” test,69 language that appeared to 
contemplate strong protection for freedom of speech. But the “clear 
and present danger” test in Schenck proved to be less than met the 
 
 65. See generally  Garrett Epps, “You Have Been in Afghanistan”: A Discourse on the Van 
Alstyne Method, 54 Duke L.J. 1553 (2005). 
 66. William Van Alstyne, A Graphic Review of the Free Speech Clause, 70 CAL. L. REV. 
107 (1982), reprinted in VAN ALSTYNE, supra note 2. 
 67. Id. 
 68. 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (Holmes, J.). 
 69. When a nation is at war many things that might be said in time of peace are 
such a hindrance that their utterance will not be endured so long as men 
fight and that no Court could regard them as protected by any 
constitutional right. It seems to be admitted that if an actual obstruction of 
the recruiting service were proved, liability for words that produced that 
effect might be enforced. The statute . . . punishes conspiracies to obstruct 
as well as actual obstruction. If the act, (speaking, or circulating a paper,) 
its tendency and the intent with which it is done are the same, we perceive 
no ground for saying that success alone warrants making the act a crime. 
Id. at 52. 
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eye. Despite the seeming toughness of a standard that required that 
the “danger” be both “clear” and “present,” Holmes in the same 
opinion talked of how things that could be said during times of peace 
could not be said during war, and he applied his test quite casually in 
sending Schenck to the clink.70 The bad tendency test, under which 
the mere tendency of speech to cause harm justified its regulation, got 
worse in Debs v. United States71 and Frohwerk v. United States.72 As 
applied by the early Holmes, “clear and present danger” meant 
neither “clear” nor “present”; all that was required to support a 
conviction for seditious speech was proof of the speaker’s bad intent 
and evidence of the speech’s bad tendency. 
2. Clear and Present Danger. Holmes had a conversion 
experience in Abrams v. United States,73 in which he wrote one of the 
most eloquent dissents in the history of the Court, setting forth his 
elegant defense of the marketplace of ideas.74 The rhetoric in Holmes’ 
Abrams dissent soared like roaring opera, thundering that “we should 
be eternally vigilant against attempts to check the expression of 
opinions that we loathe and believe to be fraught with death, unless 
they so imminently threaten immediate interference with the lawful 
 
 70. Id. at 52–53. 
 71. See 249 U.S. 211, 214–15 (1919) (Holmes, J.) (upholding a conviction against a speaker 
who engaged in core political speech in opposition to a war). 
 72. 249 U.S. 204 (1919) (Holmes, J.). In Frohwerk, perhaps the least well-known of these 
Holmes cases, the Supreme Court dealt with prosecutions arising from a series of articles critical 
of the war effort in a German language newspaper in Missouri with a minuscule circulation, 
Staats Zeitung . The articles declared it a monumental and inexcusable mistake to send 
American soldiers to France, and touted the undiminished strength and unconquerable spirit of 
the German people. After describing the plight of the draftee, one article asked rhetorically, 
who would pronounce the draftee guilty for following “the first impulse of nature: self-
preservation.” Id. at 208. Frohwerk was convicted under the Espionage Act of 1917 and 
sentenced to a fine and ten years’ imprisonment. Justice Holmes, writing for a unanimous 
Court, affirmed the conviction. Holmes noted that Frohwerk’s articles actually had condemned 
violence, deploring draft riots in Oklahoma and elsewhere. But the language Frohwerk used, 
Holmes insisted, “might be taken to convey an innuendo of a different sort .” Id. at 207. The 
First Amendment, Holmes noted, could not have been “intended to give immunity for every 
possible use of language.” Id. at 206. He then reiterated the holding in Schenck that a person 
may be convicted for conspiracy to obstruct the draft “by words of persuasion.” Id. Holmes 
conceded that “[w]e do not lose our right to condemn either measures or men because the 
Country is at war.” Id. at 208. Holmes then went on, however, to affirm Frohwerk’s conviction 
by claiming that “on [the] record it is impossible to say that it might not have been found that 
the circulation of the paper was in qua rters where a little breath would be enough to kindle a 
flame and that the fact was known and relied upon by those who sent the paper out.” Id. at 209. 
 73. 250 U.S. 616 (1919).  
 74. Id. at 630 (Holmes, J, dissenting).  
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and pressing purposes of the law that an immediate check is required 
to save the country.”75 Brandeis would later elaborate, in his 
wonderful opinion in Whitney v. California,76 admonishing that the 
“fitting remedy for evil counsels is good ones.”77 As Professor Van 
Alstyne so cogently explained, the bad tendency test was far less 
protective of freedom of speech than a conscientiously applied “clear 
and present danger” test.78 Under “clear and present danger,” the 
harm must be real, not speculative, and it must be immediate. “Bad 
tendency,” however, does not speak to the gravity or clarity of the 
harm, and requires no immediacy at all, merely the potential that the 
speech would tend to cause harm, at some vague ly defined future 
time.79 
3. The Hand / Dennis Test. The First Amendment test 
suggested by Judge Learned Hand and adopted by the Supreme 
Court in Dennis v. United States80 directs courts “in each case” to 
engage in an algebraic measure, computing whether “the gravity of 
the ‘evil,’ discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of 
free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger.”81 On the plus side of 
the ledger, the Hand test calls for the calculation to be made by the 
judiciary, and to be made in each case. The ostensible objectivity of 
the exercise, its reducibility to a chalkboard equation, and the fact 
that it can be universally applied to virtually any free speech problem 
also contribute to its threshold seductiveness. 
If the Hand / Dennis test has the aesthetic appeal of well-defined 
math, however, it is not well-calculated to protect “the freedom of 
speech.” When the harm the government seeks to redress is deemed 
relatively trivial—a simple fleeting trespass, for example—the Hand 
test calls for  a high degree of probable harm before speech may be 
abridged. The difficulty, however, is that when the articulated harm is 
catastrophic, speech may be abridged on virtually no showing of 
 
 75. Id. 
 76. 274 U.S. 357 (1927).  
 77. Id. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
 78. See VAN ALSTYNE, supra  note 2, at 35 (describing Holmes’ test to be just as protective 
as the modern test). 
 79. See Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 215 (1919) (holding that speech likely to cause 
harm is unprotected when the speaker intends the harm). 
 80. 341 U.S. 494 (1951) 
 81. Id. at 510 (quoting  United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950) (L. Hand, 
J.)). 
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probability at all.82 If one articulates the harm as the violent 
overthrow of the United States government (the claimed harm in 
Dennis itself, which involved Communist Party prosecutions) or 
nuclear holocaust (such as in the infamous Progressive H-Bomb 
case83), even speech with no realistic chance of ripening into actual 
disaster may be punished. In the dark light of the terrorist attacks of 
September 11 and the ongoing ripples of violence that have emanated 
throughout the world in its aftermath, society might be tempted to 
treat any inflammatory rhetoric (such as describing America as the 
“great Satan” and urging the propriety of Jihad) as triggering 
calamitous possibilities, and by that measure punish it. 
4. The Brandenburg Incitement Test. The “clear and present 
danger” test was reconstituted in Brandenburg v. Ohio,84 in which the 
Court announced the currently-governing standard: 
the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press 
do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the 
use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy 
is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action 
and is likely to incite or produce such action.85 
5. Categorical Approaches and Thoughts on the Limits of 
Formulas. Casting a long shadow over all of these tests is an approach 
to First Amendment law that is not geared to probabilities or harms 
at all, but rather employs a very different methodology. Speech might 
be subdivided into various categories which might then be ranked 
according to their value or importance, perhaps arranged in 
concentric circles with the most important speech at the core and the 
less important speech at the periphery. First Amendment protection 
would be strongest at the center and weakest at the perimeter.86 
 
 82. See VAN ALSTYNE, supra  note 2, at 30 (“The greater the evil, the less probable need be 
its occurrence to forbid speech . . . .”). 
 83. See United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990, 997 (W.D. Wis. 1974) 
(upholding prior restraint against the  publication of a magazine article explaining how a spy or 
terrorist could use information in the public domain to gather the scientific information (but not 
the fissionable material) needed to manufacture a nuclear bomb). 
 84. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).  
 85. Id. at 447. 
 86. Professor Van Alstyne presents such a model (as food for discussion) in his graphic 
review of free speech jurisprudence. VAN ALSTYNE, supra note 2, at 42. 
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At times the Supreme Court has embraced this methodology, 
and it is worthy of deep critique. Let me take as my text the pivotal 
passage in the Supreme Court’s 1942 decision in Chaplinsky v. New 
Hampshire,87 a case that Professor Van Alstyne has also used as a 
foil.88 Chaplinsky is a case that predates the elevation of the Holmes / 
Brandeis / Brandenburg formulation. I believe, however, that it 
continues to exert a powerful gravitational pull on First Amendment 
jurisprudence, a pull in opposition to the instincts of Professor Van 
Alstyne and at least one of his pupils (me). Chaplinsky had echoes of 
common-law Blackstone but actually went far beyond Blackstone in 
suggesting a comprehensive approach to freedom of speech, namely, 
that the law ought not protect speech inimical to the social interests in 
order and morality: 
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of 
speech, the prevention and punishment of which has never been 
thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd 
and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or ‘fighting’ 
words—those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to 
incite an immediate breach of the peace. It has been well observed 
that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, 
and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit 
that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social 
interest in order and morality.89 
The passage opens with remarkable boldness: “There are certain 
well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention 
and punishment of which has never been thought to raise any 
Constitutional problem.”90 For those who would later wish to make 
Chaplinsky out to be a case that advances the cause of freedom of 
speech, only the first eleven words of this sentence matter. First 
Amendment civil liberties lawyers and lawyers representing large 
mass media companies still cite Chaplinsky with approval in briefs, 
and Supreme Court Justices who are generally sympathetic to 
expansive protection for freedom of speech also still cite Chaplinsky 
 
 87. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).  
 88. VAN ALSTYNE, supra  note 2, at 26 & n.21. 
 89. Chaplinsky , 315 U.S. at 571–72. 
 90. Id. at 571. 
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in their opinions.91 When they cite the case, however, they mean to 
invoke only these first eleven words, pressing them for the 
proposition that the regulation of expression in America is limited to 
the proscription of “certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes 
of speech.”92 With this limiting spin, Chaplinsky can be made out to 
be a pro-free speech opinion, drawing the constitutional line in the 
sand around speech falling within the “well-defined and narrowly 
limited classes.”93 
But this accounting is not a credible one. The remainder of the 
first sentence itself gives the game away, expanding the thought with 
the intrepid declaration that these classes of speech have “never been 
thought to raise any  Constitutional problem.”94 Never been thought to 
raise any  problem! Never would seem to lay straight what historians 
have found crooked, seemingly returning to Blackstone and the 
original understandings of the Framers. Any means “any”—so that 
the proscription of these classes does not trigger any need to balance 
competing interests, or satisfy some doctrinal standard requiring 
harm or intent or causal proximity. If the first sentence of the 
Chaplinsky passage is to be taken seriously , it seems to mean that 
speech falling within these categories—“the lewd and obscene, the 
profane, the libelous”95—will receive no constitutional protection at 
all. 
Consider next the second fascinating passage in Chaplinsky—the 
second half of the second sentence. Also among the proscribable 
categories are the “insulting or ‘fighting’ words—those which by their 
very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of 
the peace.”96 This sentence fragment is often referred to as 
enunciating  the “fighting words” doctrine, and that is fair enough.97 
But note that the Court speaks of “insulting” words as well as 
 
 91. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358 (2003) (O’Connor, J.) (citing , with approval, 
Chaplinksy ); Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 740 (1996) 
(Breyer, J.) (citing , with approval, Chaplinsky ). 
 92. Chaplinsky , 315 U.S. at 571. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. (emphasis added). 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. See Black, 538 U.S. at 359 (describing with approval Chaplinsky’s “fighting words” 
doctrine); Avis Rent A Car System, Inc., v. Aguilar, 529 U.S. 1138, 1141 (2000) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting from the denial of certiorari) (describing, with approval, Chaplinsky’s “fighting 
words” doctrine). 
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“fighting” words. They are not the same. An insult is an affront to 
human dignity. An insult works its harm through non-physical 
offense. The insult is complete and the affront accrues when the 
words themselves are uttered. No fisticuffs or palpable violence need 
follow. “Fighting words” are a bit different. Fighting words are a kind 
of super-insult, words that tend to provoke physical consequences—a 
punch in the nose or a riot. The passage confirms this dichotomy. As 
the Court elaborates, “insulting” words and “fighting” words are 
“those which by their very utterance inflict injury,” (the insulting 
words) “or” (the “or” being quite critical here), those which “tend to 
incite an immediate breach of the peace” (the fighting words). Thus 
the Court in this sentence means to describe two quite different kinds 
of speech that may cause harms—speech that harms because it 
offends or insults, and speech that harms because it incites or 
provokes. The Court refers to these in the disjunctive, using “or” and 
not “and,” thus clearly demarking these two harms as alternative and 
equally viable bases for preventing or punishing speech. 
In the third sentence the Chaplinsky  Court waxes philosophical. 
In an extraordinarily efficient single sentence, the doctrinal 
exposition in the first two sentences is infused with its animating 
theory: “It has been well observed that such utterances are no 
essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social 
value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from 
them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and 
morality.”98 This is the most perfect articulation ever of the balancing 
test that lies at the heart of all those who believe that, in the end, 
freedom of speech must always be measured against other vital 
societal interests in order and morality, and, additionally, that this 
balance is value laden, with high value speech getting the better of the 
balance than low value speech. As with the sentences preceding it, 
this sentence is meaning-packed. “[S]uch utterances are no essential 
part of any exposition of ideas . . . .”99 The Court does not say they 
play no part, but no essential part. Thus one need not say “Fuck the 
draft” in order to express the idea “oppose the draft.” One need not 
burn a flag to express the idea of dissent from the war effort. 
Reinforcing this theme, the passage speaks of exposition, connoting 
the use of language, reason, argument—an intellectual enterprise, 
 
 98. Chaplinsky , 315 U.S. at 572. 
 99. Id. (emphasis added). 
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something more than burning a piece of cloth. Most profoundly, the 
passage articulates with pristine clarity the theory driving the balance 
struck: such speech is “of slight social value as a step to truth that any 
benefit that may be derived from [it] is clearly outweighed by the 
social interest in order and morality.”100 This is decidedly not the stuff 
of the marketplace of ideas, for Chaplinsky does not leave the test of 
truth to the power of the idea to command the market. Chaplinsky 
itself contemplates that the test of truth has already been 
administered, and these forms of speech have flunked the test, have 
been certified already as truth retarded, as of only “slight social value 
as a step to truth,” and, perhaps most importantly, have already been 
deemed unfit for decent society, as “outweighed by the social interest 
in order and morality.” And, once again, note that Chaplinksy is not 
just about keeping order—it is about keeping morality as well. 
Chaplinsky is not limited to the speech that might breach the peace; it 
extends to speech that offends society’s moral sensibilities. 
Read generously, this authentic Chaplinsky might be best 
understood as not intended to be entirely category-bound at all. It 
might be read as articulating a sweeping theory, a balancing test in 
which government has the freedom to pass on the social value and 
truth-utility of speech and weigh those variables against morality and 
good order. The various categories listed at the beginning of the 
passage might be understood as merely evocative, not exhaustive. 
Thus the examples on the list would automatically qualify as 
categories of speech that might be punished without any 
constitutional problem, but new categories of constitutionally 
proscribable  speech could also emerge. Alternatively, even if 
Chaplinksy is read as inviting a mechanical approach to all First 
Amendment problems, creating a “list” of taboo categories that come 
certified as not worth the candle, and freezing First Amendment law 
to the particular classes contained in the list, at least one of the 
categories, describing those words which “by their very utterance 
inflict injury,” is dangerously amorphous. The phrase does not define 
what is meant by “injury” and might open the door to punishment of 
any speech that has the capacity to offend or cause listeners mental or 
emotional distress. 
Strictly as a descriptive matter, much of modern First 
Amendment law has passed by Chaplinsky. On the surface, its 
 
 100. Id. 
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seemingly simplistic “categorical” approach to addressing First 
Amendment problems would seem washed away, an observation that 
Professor Van Alstyne has also made.101 Sexually explicit material 
that might fairly be described as “lewd and obscene” now receives 
substantial First Amendment protection, with the degree of 
protection depending on the circumstances and method of 
regulation;102 speech that is merely “profane” in the sense of being 
vulgar or blasphemous is now recognized as entirely protected;103 
speech that is “libelous” now benefits from vast First Amendment 
protection, particularly when it involves public officials or public 
figure plaintiffs on issues of public concern;104 and the “fighting 
words” doctrine, although still alive, has been significantly honed and 
narrowed by being honed and harmonized with the highly protective 
intent and immediacy standards emanating from cases such as 
Brandenburg v. Ohio.105 
But I do not believe Chaplinsky  is dead, much as I might come to 
bury it. Fast-forward to a recent Supreme Court decision that again 
confronted the social interests in order and morality, and the 
antagonistic gravitational pulls of Chaplinsky and the Holmes / 
Brandeis / Brandenburg approach to defining “the freedom of 
speech” are again apparent. The case, Virginia v. Black,106 involved a 
challenge to a Virginia statute that first made it a crime to burn a 
cross with the intent of intimidating any person, and then treated the 
burning of a cross itself as prima facie evidence of such intent.107 If, in 
 
 101. VAN ALSTYNE, supra  note 2, at 26 & n.21. 
 102. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997) (“[T]he CDA[’s] . . . burden on adult 
speech is unacceptable if less restrictive alternatives would be at least as effective in achieving 
the legitimate purpose that the statute was enacted to serve.”); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 
568 (1969) (protecting the  private possession of obscene material in the home). 
 103. See, e.g., Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 53 (1988) (holding that vulgar 
speech about a public figure that causes emotional distress may not be restricted); Cohen v. 
California, 403 U.S. 15, 24–25 (1971) (declaring that “verbal tumult, discord, and even offensive 
utterance” are necessary consequences of open debate, and suggesting that, often, “one man’s 
vulgarity is another’s lyric”); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 506 (1952) (rejecting 
a state’s attempt to ban films that a censor has determined to be “sacrilegious”).  
 104. Cf. Hustler Magazine, 485 U.S. at 57 (holding that the publisher of an ad parody 
depicting Jerry Falwell in an “outrageous” manner is not liable for damages resulting from 
emotional distress). 
 105. 395 U.S. 444 (1969);  see also Cohen, 403 U.S. at 20 (rejecting the application of the 
“fighting words” doctrine because ne ither intent nor actual provocation were shown). 
 106. 538 U.S. 343 (2003). In the interest of full disclosure, the author was Counsel for the 
Respondents in this case. 
 107. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2–423 (Michie 1996): 
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light of the horrific legacy of violence of the Ku Klux Klan, one treats 
a burning cross as always being a “code” for a terrorist threat, which 
was the argument advanced by the Commonwealth of Virginia,108 
then one might treat it as easily embraced by even the narrower 
understandings of Chaplinksy. Indeed, a “threat” is arguably an easier 
First Amendment case than “fighting words,” in that the harm that 
flows from a threat flows immediately—the “evil” need never be 
discounted by any probability (as Learned Hand might require) or 
measured by any yardstick of “clear and present danger” (as Holmes 
and Brandeis might require) because the evil is fully consummated 
and complete once the threat itself is made. One need only determine 
if the “threat” is genuine or merely hyperbolic—in the styled parlance 
of First Amendment art, whether it is a “true threat.” This 
Chaplinsky-style definitional exercise (not unlike the exercise used to 
determine whether speech is or is not “obscene,” as Professor Van 
Alstyne might observe109) hearkens to cases such as Watts v. United 
States110 and NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.111 
 
It shall be unlawful for any person or persons, with the intent of intimidating any 
person or group of persons, to burn, or cause to be burned, a cross on the property of 
another, a highway or other public place. Any person who shall violate any provision 
of this section shall be guilty of a Class 6 felony. 
Any such burning of a cross shall be prima facie evidence of an intent to intimidate a 
person or group of persons. 
 108. See Black, 538 U.S. at 391 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“I wholeheartedly agree with the 
observation made by the Commonwealth of Virginia that: ‘A white, conservative, middle-class 
Protestant, waking up at night to find a burning cross outside his home, will reasonably 
understand that someone is threatening him.’” (quoting Brief of Petitioner)). 
 109. See VAN ALSTYNE, supra note 2, at 26 & n.18 (noting the categorical treatment of 
obscenity by the Supreme Court). 
 110. 394 U.S. 705 (1969) (per curiam). The defendant Watts was convicted of willfully 
making a threat to take the life of the president during a public rally at the Washington 
Monument. Id. at 705–06. In the course of expressing his opposition to the draft, Watts stated 
that “I have already received my draft classification as 1-A and I have got to report for my 
physical this Monday coming. I am not going. If they ever make me carry a rifle the first man I 
want to get in my sights is L. B. J.” Id. at 706. The Court summarily reversed Watts’ conviction, 
holding that the statement, taken in context, was “a kind of very crude offensive method of 
stating a political opposition to the President” and was protected by the First Amendment. Id. 
at 708 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 111. 458 U.S. 886 (1982). In Claiborne Hardware, the Supreme Court applied Brandenburg 
principles to overturn a conviction arising from a civil rights boycott of merchants in Mississippi. 
Id. at 928–29. The tactics of the boycott organizers were found by the Mississippi Supreme 
Court to include threats, intimidation, and coercion. Id. at 894. The Supreme Court, however, 
held that the actions of the boycott organizers were protected by  the First Amendment. Id. at 
911–12: 
In sum, the boycott clearly involved constitutionally protected activity. The 
established elements of speech, assembly, association, and petition, “though not 
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The Supreme Court, in a splintered decision, struck down the 
Virginia law as applied to a Ku Klux Klan rally conducted on a 
private farm, emphasizing the unconstitutionality of the provision in 
the law that treated the mere burning of a cross as “prima facie” 
evidence of an intent to intimidate, but held that a law with this prima 
facie evidence provision severed would be constitutional.112 Having 
written much about the case elsewhere, my purpose here is not to 
deconstruct the result or rationale , but merely to point out how the 
ghosts of Chaplinsky continue to haunt the woods. 
D. Summing up Van Alstyne’s Insights Regarding “The Freedom of 
Speech” 
As Professor Van Alstyne has persuasively argued, even a 
standard as promising as the Brandenburg incitement test is still 
“dramatically incomplete.”113 The difficulty posed is that even under 
the Holmes / Brandeis / Brandenburg approach, the legislature 
remains free to accomplish through two steps what it was forbidden 
to do in one.114 The test fails to impose any freestanding First 
Amendment threshold of seriousness to the “lawless action.” No one, 
for example, would doubt that the legislature could make it a crime to 
engage in terrorism, outlawing violent attacks on people and 
property. The First Amendment, however, would normally act as a 
bar to any attempt to impose liability for the mere abstract advocacy 
of the propriety of making war on the United States. What Professor 
Van Alstyne points out, however, is that the legislature, if it has a free 
hand in defining what constitutes “lawless action,” could define the 
brandishing of a defined symbol with a defined intent (such as a 
burning cross with intent to intimidate) as presumptively “lawless 
 
identical, are inseparable.” Through exercise of these First Amendment rights, 
petitioners sought to bring about political, social, and economic change. Through 
speech, assembly, and petition—rather than through riot or revolution—petitioners 
sought to change a social order that had consistently treated them as second-class 
citizens. 
(internal citation omitted). More  importantly, the Supreme Court rejected an attempt to impose 
liability on civil rights leader Charles Evers for highly charged statements made by Evers in the 
course of a speech exhorting others to part icipate in the boycott, stating that “[t]o the extent 
that Evers caused respondents to suffer business losses through his organization of the boycott, 
his emotional and persuasive appeals for unity in the joint effort, or his ‘threats’ of vilification or 
social ostracism, Evers’ conduct is constitutionally protected and beyond the reach of a damages 
award.” Id. at 926. 
 112. Black, 538 U.S. at 362–68. 
 113. VAN ALSTYNE, supra note 2, at 36. 
 114. Id. 
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action.”115 This would obviate the necessity of establishing a 
connection in time or probability between the expressive action and 
future lawless action, because the burning of the cross itself becomes 
lawless action.116 Although the ultimate disaster (the destruction of 
the nation by terrorists) might be remote, small incremental steps 
working toward that end might be quite immediate, and the 
legislature might, through passage of sweeping measures (as some 
might label the Patriot Act, for example), make dramatic incursions 
on First Amendment rights by using two steps to make a jump it 
could not make in one. 
This analysis suggests, just as Professor Van Alstyne’s insights 
suggest, that even formulations as elegant as “clear and present 
danger” require doctrinal refinements and case-by-case attention, if 
they are to be worthy of the strain of “near-absolutism” suggested by 
the unequivocal command of the text to “make no law . . . abridging 
the freedom of speech . . . .”117 
This is a constitutional work-in-progress. It is an experiment, as 
Holmes would say, “as all life is an experiment.”118 We may all be 
thankful that William Van Alstyne has been a robust player in that 
experiment. The clarity of his thought and persuasiveness of his 
arguments have helped keep the enterprise on track. The core 
content of the First Amendment, the meaning of “the freedom of 
speech,” would be far weaker without his efforts. 
 
 115. See VAN ALSTYNE, supra  note 2, at 36 (recognizing that a legislature might simply 
make additions to the categories of evils properly proscribed, and thereby restrict formerly 
permissible speech). 
 116. The notion that such a two-step process might at times be constitutionally permissible is 
essentially the view expressed by Justice Thomas in his dissent in Virginia v. Black. See 538 U.S. 
at 388 (Thomas, J., dissenting): 
In my view, whatever expressive value cross burning has, the legislature simply wrote 
it out by banning only intimidating conduct undertaken by a particular means. A 
conclusion that the statute prohibiting cross burning with intent to intimidate sweeps 
beyond a prohibition on certain conduct into the zone of expression overlooks not 
only the words of the statute but also reality. 
 117. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 118. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“That 
at any rate is the theory of our Constitution. It is an experiment, as all life is an experiment.”).  
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II.  FREE SPEECH IN THE CONTEXT OF THE 
GOVERNMENT AS A PUTATIVE PARTICIPANT 
A. Rights v. Privileges 
Among the things that “the freedom of speech” would come to 
mean in modern times is that government must not only avoid 
outright regulatory “abridgments” of speech but must also justify 
limitations on speech accomplished through the attachment of 
conditions on government largess. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes is 
once again an early foil, and Professor William Van Alstyne  is the 
theorist largely responsible for foiling him. 
Holmes was an early architect of the “right-privilege” distinction, 
a glib constitutional doctrine that posited that government could 
place whatever conditions it wished on the receipt of public benefits, 
even if it otherwise would have lacked the power to impose the same 
prohibition as a naked restraint. In Commonwealth v. Davis,119 for 
example, Holmes sustained an ordinance that prohibited public 
speaking in a municipal park without a permit from the mayor. 
Holmes treated the city as a landlord with the power to exclude 
anyone from the park altogether. The greater power to exclude 
necessarily included the lesser power to admit with conditions 
attached.120 Justice Holmes, then on the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts, held that “[f]or the legislature absolutely or 
conditionally to forbid public speaking in a highway or public park is 
no more an infringement of the rights of a member of the public than 
for the owner of a private house to forbid it in his house.”121 Similarly, 
when a police officer was fired for talking politics while on duty, 
Holmes dismissed the officer’s First Amendment challenge with the 
blunt quip: “The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk 
politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman.”122 
There is no American legal thinker who deserves more credit for 
discrediting the Holmes right-privilege distinction than Professor Van 
Alstyne, who set the course in his powerful and influential piece, The 
 
 119. 39 N.E. 113 (Mass. 1895), aff’d sub nom. Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43 (1897). 
 120. Id. at 113. 
 121. Id. 
 122. McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892) (Holmes, J.). 
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Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law.123 The 
article, which traversed territory far broader than speech issues, 
supplied a much-needed theoretical justification for limitations on the 
conditions that government may properly place on the receipt of 
public goods,124 and First Amendment law has benefited ever since. 
The Supreme Court has on many occasions rejected the right-
privilege distinction.125 Many Supreme Court Justices, writing in 
concurrence126 or dissent,127 have drawn on Professor Van Alstyne’s 
 
 123. See Van Alstyne, Right-Privilege Distinction, supra note 21; see also Richard A. 
Epstein, The Supreme Court, 1987 Term—Foreword: Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, 
and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1988); Charles A. Reich, The Liberty Impact of 
the New Property , 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 295 (1990); Charles A. Reich, The New Property , 73 
YALE L.J. 733 (1964); Rodney A. Smolla, Preserving the Bill of Rights in the Modern 
Administrative-Industrial State, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 321 (1990); Rodney A. Smolla, The 
Reemergence of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law: The Price of Protesting 
Too Much, 35 STAN. L. REV. 69 (1982) [hereinafter Smolla, Reemergence of the Right-Privilege 
Distinction]; Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1415 (1989); 
Van Alstyne, New Property, supra  note 21. 
 124. See Van Alstyne, Right-Privilege Distinction, supra note 21, at 1459–62 (attacking 
Holmes’s reasoning and the assumptions on which the right-privilege distinction is based). 
 125. See, e.g., Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 547–49 (2001) (conditions 
placed on practices of lawyers funded through legal aid funds violated First Amendment); Elrod 
v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 372–73 (1976) (holding political patronage system unconstitutional); 
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) (stating that public 
school students do not “shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at 
the schoolhouse gate”). 
 126. See O’Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Ctr., 447 U.S. 773, 795–96 (1980) (Blackmun, J., 
concurring): 
To state a general rule, however, is not to decide a specific case. The Court never has 
held that any  substantive restriction upon removal of any  governmental benefit gives 
rise to a generalized property interest in its continued enjoyment. Indeed, a majority 
of the Justices of this Court are already on record as concluding that the term 
‘property’ sometimes incorporates limiting characterizations of statutorily bestowed 
interests. Common sense and sound policy support this recognition of some measure 
of flexibility in defining ‘new property’ expectancies. Public benefits are not held in 
fee simple. 
(citations omitted) (citing Van Alstyne, New Property , supra  note 21, at 460–66); McDaniel v. 
Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 633 & n.6 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring) (describing Sherbert v. Verner as 
resting on the fact that the state had forced the claimant “‘to choose between following the 
precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of the 
precepts of her religion in order to accept work, on the other hand,’” and stating that “Sherbert 
did not state a new principle in this regard” (quoting Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 
(1963) (citing Van Alstyne, Right-Privilege Distinction, supra note 21)); Cruz v. Hauck, 404 U.S. 
59, 65 & n.14 (1971) (per curiam) (Douglas, J., concurring): 
It is apparent that this disparate treatment has the effect of classifying appellants 
according to wealth, which, like race, is a suspect classification. Accordingly, this 
classification could withstand challenge only upon a showing of compelling 
circumstances. Respondent offers none but simply repeats the discredited maxim that 
paupers’ appeals are privileges, not rights. 
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scholarship to reinforce the demise of the right-privilege distinction, 
or either to extol or lament its seeming reappearance. 
The approach that has emerged forces the government, when 
confronted with the claim that it has placed impermissible restrictions 
on the receipt of largess, to justify the restrictions in neutral terms 
related to the mission of the program. The justification is analyzed 
under various balancing tests that, although not as speech-protective 
as those tests that apply when government seeks to regulate speech in 
the general marketplace, nonetheless provide the speaker with 
sufficiently hardy legal doctrine to make the contest a fair fight.128 
When the restriction instead is exposed as an effort to skew the 
marketplace of ideas by using government funding to engage in 
viewpoint discrimination, the restriction is unconstitutional.129 
This is our working constitutional divide, and we have the work 
of William Van Alstyne to thank for helping us to intelligently chart 
it. Yet constitutional divides, like continental divides, are at times 
jagged and uneven, and it is easy to fall off or lose sight of the path. It 
is worth sampling a few of the critical doctrinal battlegrounds, such as 
public forum law and the law governing the speech of government 
employees, to get a sense of the struggle. 
 
(citations omitted) (citing Van Alstyne, Right-Privilege Distinction, supra note 21). 
 127. See Peer v. Griffeth, 445 U.S. 970, 970 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from the denial 
of certiorari) (“There has been much decisional law from this and other courts, and much 
scholarly commentary , as to what is a protected ‘property’ interest under the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause, and what procedural guarantees are necessary under that 
Clause before one may be denied such a property interest.” (citing  Van Alstyne, New Property, 
supra note 21)); Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 583 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“It is 
said that since teaching in a public school is a privilege, the State can grant it or withhold it on 
conditions. We have, however, rejected that thesis in numerous cases.” (citing  Van Alstyne, 
Right-Privilege Distinction, supra note 21)); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 493 (1972) 
(Douglas, J., dissenting in part) (“[W]e have long discarded the right-privilege distinction.” 
(citing Van Alstyne, Right-Privilege Distinction, supra  note 21)); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 
U.S. 471, 520 & n.14 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“In my view, equal protection analysis of 
this case is not appreciably advanced by the a priori definition of a ‘right,’ fundamental or 
otherwise.” (citing  Van Alstyne, Right-Privilege Distinction, supra note 21)). 
 128. See supra  notes 17–19 and accompanying text (describing limitations to content-
discrimination by the government when funding expression). 
 129. A somewhat old but hauntingly au courant synopsis is that of Homer v. Richmond, 292 
F.2d 719, 722 (D.C. Cir. 
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B. Public Forum Law 
Public forum law is a highly stylized and easy-to-parody body of 
law through which the Supreme Court seeks to divide those 
government programs and spaces into two forms. Some programs and 
spaces are truly “public” in a free speech sense and presumptively 
open to indiscriminate exercise of freedom of expression and thus 
heavily protected from regulation based on content or viewpoint. 
Other programs and spaces are those that exist primarily to advance 
some governmental business, and thus subject to balancing tests 
supplying more the more moderated quantum of protection attendant 
to “intermediate scrutiny” levels of judicial review. Despite its 
stylistic density and concomitant vulnerability to ridicule, as a rough 
functional divide public forum law is both a potent antidote to the 
right-privilege distinction of Justice Holmes and a reasonably 
serviceable workhorse First Amendment doctrine. 
Public forum law begins with a robust rejection of the Holmes 
view in Commonwealth v. Davis,130 the view that the government may 
exclude speakers from public spaces with the same cavalier whimsy 
with which a curmudgeonly landlord might exclude a visitor from 
private property. Certain public spaces—streets, sidewalks, parks131—
are deemed “traditional public fora,” places that have a kind of “free 
speech easement” that runs with them and are subject only to those 
restrictions on the content or viewpoint of expression that are banned 
virtually per se.132 Yet these spaces can also be subject to restrictions 
on the mere “time, place, or manner” of the speech that are subject to 
an intermediate-scrutiny balancing test that tests the significance of 
the government’s rationale for regulation, the tailoring of the 
regulatory effort, and the availability of alternative channels of 
 
 130. See supra notes 119–22 and accompanying text. 
 131. See United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983) (“‘[P]ublic places’ historically 
associated with the free exercise of expre ssive activities, such as streets, sidewalks, and parks, 
are considered, without more, to be ‘public forums.’ In such places, the government’s ability to 
permissibly restrict expressive conduct is very limited . . . .” (citations omitted)). 
 132. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321, 329 (1988) (applying “exacting scrutiny” to a 
District of Columbia law prohibiting the display of signs critical of a foreign government within 
500 yards of that government’s embassy, and ruling that law facially violative of the  First 
Amendment); Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 515 (1976) (noting that access to “streets, 
sidewalks, parks, and other similar public places” for the purpose of exercising First 
Amendment rights “cannot constitutionally be denied broadly and absolutely”) (quoting 
Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308, 315 
(1976)). 
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communication.133 The strength of the doctrine here is that the 
traditional public forum is open to speech whether the government 
desires this result or not. The Supreme Court has thus held that 
“traditional public fora are open for expressive activity regardless of 
the government’s intent. The objective characteristics of these 
properties require the government to accommodate private 
speakers.”134 
Once outside “traditional public fora,” modern public forum law 
gets more complicated, and correspondingly less theoretically and 
doctrinally pure, but it is defensible nonetheless. Through a kind of 
“adverse possession,” government property and programs that are 
not traditionally open to expression may become so-called 
“designated public fora” when the government treats the space (a 
municipal theater, for example135) as a space open to a wide range of 
expression.136 Then there are nonpublic fora, spaces that are deemed 
functional but not dedicated to expression,137 and the curious hybrid 
known as the “limited public forum,” open to expressive activity but 
limited to certain subject matter or patrons.138 At the margins the 
application of this body of law may be difficult, with courts reaching 
 
 133. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989): 
[E]ven in a public forum the  government may impose reasonable restrictions on the 
time, place, or manner of protected speech, provided the restrictions “are justified 
without reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly 
tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and that they leave open ample 
alternative cha nnels for communication of the information.” 
(quoting Clark v. Comm. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)). 
 134. Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 678 (1998). 
 135. See Southeastern Promotions, Ltd., v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 555 (1975) (holding the 
denial of an application to perform at a municipal theater to be a prior restraint on the use of a 
public forum).  
 136. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985) 
(“[W]hen the Government has intentionally designated a place or means of communication as a 
public forum speakers cannot be excluded without a compelling governmental interest.”). 
 137. See United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 730, 737 (1990) (holding that a sidewalk in 
front of a post office was not a public forum). 
 138. A university, for example, might open classrooms or funding programs to student 
groups and be forbidden from discriminating on the basis of content or viewpoint among those 
groups. See Rosenbe rger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 837 (1995) 
(holding that a university policy of denying funding to any student group that “primarily 
promotes or manifests a particular belie[f] in or about a deity or an ultimate reality” infringes 
the right to free speech (alteration in original) (quoting Appendix to Petition for Certiorari at 
66a)); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 277 (1981) (striking down content-based discrimination 
by a university in its classroom use policies). 
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conflicting results on essentially equivalent facts.139 But on the whole, 
the use of context to divide government property into public and 
private spaces, with a generally generous willingness to classify spaces 
public and provide a healthy measure of protection when they are so 
classified, represents a laudable advance in First Amendment 
doctrine. 
C. The Speech of Public Employees 
A similar analytic divide has emerged in public employee speech 
cases. Once again, the harsh regime of the Holmes right-privilege 
distinction has been mitigated by doctrines that now supply public 
employees with a healthy measure of First Amendment protection. 
Thus the aphorism of the political spoils system that “to the 
victor belong the spoils” has been repudiated by a line of cases 
generally forbidding the wholesale firing of government employees 
because they are affiliated with the wrong political party.140 The 
doctrine is mitigated in part by an exception that permits patronage in 
certain positions. The positions that qualify for the exception are 
usually high in the hierarchy of government and involve substantial 
policymaking authority or special solicitude for confidences. For such 
positions, party affiliation is deemed appropriate, and requiring such 
affiliation does not offend the First Amendment.141 “To the victor 
belong the spoils” has thus been supplanted by “To the victor belong 
only those spoils that may be constitutionally obtained.”142 Again, the 
doctrinal contours here are imperfect; one might well hope for 
brighter lines and greater definitional rigor in the articulation of the 
exception to the rule, but in its broad sweep the rule itself is 
beneficent, working to eliminate the application of the right-privilege 
 
 139. Compare Hotel Employees & Rest. Employees Union, Local 100 v. City of N.Y. Dep’t 
of Parks & Recreation, 311 F.3d 534, 552 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding that the plaza space at the 
Lincoln Center performing arts complex between West 62nd and West 65th Streets in 
Manhattan was not a traditional public forum), with First Unitarian Church v. Salt Lake City 
Corp., 308 F.3d 1114, 1131 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding that a portion of a street in the downtown 
Salt Lake City mall area, sold by the city to the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, but 
over which the city retained an easement, was a traditional public forum). 
 140. See, e.g., Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976) (holding that “the practice of 
patronage dismissals is unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth Amendments”). 
 141. See Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 518 (1980) (“[T]he ultimate inquiry is not whether 
the label ‘policymaker’ or ‘confidential’ fits a particular position; rather, the question is whether 
the hiring authority can demonstrate that party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the 
effective performance of the public office involved.”).  
 142. Rutan v. Republican Party, 497 U.S. 62, 64 (1990). 
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distinction in gross as applied to the vast majority of government 
employees. 
So too, a public employee fired or disciplined for speaking may 
now challenge the adverse action on First Amendment grounds. The 
court will first ask whether the employee’s speech was on a “matter of 
public concern.”143 If this question is answered affirmatively, the 
employee has a foot in the door; the court will then proceed to apply 
a balancing test, in which the interest of the employee to speak is 
balanced against the interest of the government as employer in 
promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs as an 
employer.144 In Connick v. Myers, the link to the repudiated right-
privilege distinction was made explicit; the Court openly 
acknowledged that “[f]or most of this century, the unchallenged 
dogma was that a public employee had no right to object to 
conditions placed upon the terms of employment—including those 
which restricted the exercise of constitutional rights.”145 After 
recognizing  the persistence of the right-privilege distinction, the 
Court openly rejected it as a legitimate basis for analysis.146 The Court 
instead installed its balancing test, now applied routinely by lower 
courts,147 which focuses on such factors as whether the contested 
speech was disruptive,148 insubordinate,149 or corrosive of esprit de 
corps150. 
 
 143. Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 668 (1994) (“To be protected, the [employee’s] 
speech must be on a matter of public concern . . . .”); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147–48 
(1983) (declaring that “[w]hether an employee’s speech addresses a matter of public concern 
must be determined by the content, form, and context of a given statement”); Pickering v. Bd. 
of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 571 (1968) (“[T]he question whether a school system requires additional 
funds is a matter of legitimate public concern . . . .”). 
 144. Waters, 511 U.S. at 668; Connick, 461 U.S. at 142, 146; Pickering , 391 U.S. at 568. 
 145. Connick, 461 U.S. at 143. 
 146. Id. at 144. 
 147. See, e.g., Gust afason v. Jones, 290 F.3d 895, 906 (7th Cir. 2002) (setting forth a detailed, 
multi-step balancing test for application to the Connick line of cases). 
 148. See Greer v. Amesqua, 212 F.3d 358, 372 (7th Cir. 2000) (determining that a sensational 
news release by a firefighter, accusing his chief of preferential treatment toward homosexuals, 
would disrupt the department’s operations). 
 149. See Havekost v. United States Dep’t of Navy, 925 F.2d 316, 318 (9th Cir. 1991) 
(asserting that circulation of a petition calling for the discharge of a person higher in the chain 
of duties was not speech on matters of public concern but merely an expression of a private 
workplace preference); Withiam v. Baptist Health Care, 98 F.3d 581, 583 (10th Cir. 1996) 
(expression of personal grievance not protected speech on matters of public concern). 
 150. See INS v. FLRA, 855 F.2d 1454, 1464, 1466 (9th Cir. 1988) (government as employer 
may punish employee speech that is corrosive of esprit de corps). 
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This framework was reinforced by the holding in Rankin v. 
McPherson,151 in which the Supreme Court held that an 
administrative employee in a Texas constable’s office could not be 
fired when she blurted out, upon hearing the breaking news that John 
Hinckley had shot President Ronald Reagan, that “if they go for him 
again, I hope they get him.”152 The statement, made to a co-employee 
who was also her boyfriend, arose in the context of an intense 
conversation ranging over issues relating to poverty, race, and 
President Reagan’s social policies.153 The government’s view that it 
had the right to fire McPherson was not entirely makeweight; 
certainly one might demand of law enforcement employees a 
sufficient respect for law and order that they refrain from openly 
advocating the desirability of presidential assassination as an 
instrument of social change. The Supreme Court, however, felt it 
incumbent to be sensitive both to the plainly hyperbolic character of 
McPherson’s remarks—she was merely blowing off steam to her 
boyfriend in response to emotionally charged news about a leader she 
apparently despised—and to her role within the hierarchy of the 
public agency involved.154 The Court thus noted that it could not 
“believe that every employee in Constable Rankin’s office, whether 
computer operator, electrician, or file clerk, is equally required, on 
pain of discharge, to avoid any statement susceptible of being 
interpreted by the Constable as an indication that the employee may 
be unworthy of employment in his law enforcement agency.”155 
The Connick / Pickering / Waters framework, like public forum 
analysis, can be picked at if one is so inclined.156 The “matters of 
public concern” test is highly vulnerable at times, for reasons that 
may parallel certain vulnerabilities in public forum law. There is an 
inherent tension in the notion of “matters of public concern” as 
applied to government employees. Because, in the largest sense, all of 
what goes on inside a government agency may be of concern to the 
public, when an employee criticizes agency policy or the actions of a 
 
 151. 483 U.S. 378 (1987).  
 152. Id. at 381. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. at 389–91. 
 155. Id. at 391. 
 156. See Stephen Allred, From Connick to Confusion: The Struggle to Define Speech on 
Matters of Public Concern, 64 IND. L.J. 43, 75 (1988) (citing courts’ “unbridled discretion” in 
determining “matters of public concern” as the cause of inconsistencies among lower court 
interpretations of Connick). 
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superior, the employee is arguably speaking on matters of public 
concern. Yet not all complaining employees are righteous 
whistleblowers; the government acting as employer is carrying on the 
work of a sovereign yet in many senses is using employees in much 
the same manner as any employer. This conundrum is difficult and, as 
with any legal test that attempts to reconcile such competing tensions, 
naturally generates a fair number of reported case decisions.157 Yet as 
with public forum law, there is logic to taking a middle ground, and 
with any middle ground there will be litigation as parties—who view 
the precise placement of the line in any given case through their own 
prisms of experience—contest which side of the middle they fall. The 
logic of the middle ground is that solicitude for free speech values 
ought to be at its apex when society seeks to facilitate the free 
exchange of information and ideas as part of discourse in the public 
arena. This animating value applies with diminished force, however, 
when speech is merely the vehicle through which the routine 
intramural frictions of the workplace are resolved.158 An all-or-
nothing solution in either direction would be untenable. To return to 
the regime of Holmes and the right-privilege distinction, as Professor 
Van Alstyne so cogently  explained, would permit government to 
engage in action inimical to constitutional values through the mere 
artifice of labeling.159 At the same time, however, the government has 
interests that it may invoke in certain functional contexts—as when 
the government is trying to manage property used to deliver the mail 
or run an agency with hundreds or thousands of employees organized 
in a complex hierarchy—that it does not have when it is merely acting 
as the pandemic sovereign responsible for the rule of law in the open 
marketplace. Both the public forum and public employment cases 
require vigilance, for there is the constant worry that the government 
 
 157. See RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH §§ 18:5–
18:22 (2004) (collecting and critiquing cases applying the test). 
 158. See Smolla, Reemergence of the Right-Privilege Distinction, supra note 123, at 74–75: 
[An] underlying element, one that is a close corollary of the fre edom of contract 
notion, is the idea that government should have greater latitude in its dealings with 
individuals when it acts as the proprietor of the public business rather than as the 
pandemic regulator. The proprietary-regulatory distinction, by assuming that 
restrictions are less necessary when government acts essentially as a private entity 
administering its internal business, frees government in that context from certain 
restrictions that would apply to it when it acts as a governing entity. 
(footnote omitted). 
 159. See Van Alstyne, Right-Privilege Distinction, supra note 21, at 1459 (stating that the 
government automatically denies constitutional protection by merely labeling expression a 
privilege rather than a right). 
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will cheat and attempt an illegitimate gerrymander, seeking to 
commandeer more of the public arena than that to which it is entitled. 
This illicit gerrymander might be spatial—as when the government 
seeks to exclude speech from a public plaza on the theory that it 
ought to be dedicated to quiet musings over the meanings of 
sculpture; it might be spectral—as when the government seeks to 
commandeer the spectrum of public debate over agency policy; or it 
might involve some other spectrum—as when it exerts unique 
regulatory control over the airwaves. That we must constantly watch 
how government draws its lines between public and private space, 
however, does not mean that the act of line -drawing is wrong in itself. 
D. Academic Freedom, Government Speech, and Other Conundrums 
I have set out here in some detail the manner in which the right-
privilege problem has evolved in constitutional doctrine in the 
specific contexts of public forum law and the speech of public 
employees. I have no doubt that the relatively sensible doctrinal 
evolution in these two areas, although not without tensions and 
difficulties, owes a great deal to the seminal efforts of William Van 
Alstyne. 
A large part of First Amendment law today is really the demise 
of the right-privilege distinction working itself pure. We have William 
Van Alstyne to thank for the kick-start his thinking gave to this 
healthy but always contentious process. With enough space and time, 
one could trace the same right-privilege problem through any number 
of other problems, such as the free speech issues surrounding public 
schools,160 the government funding of speech,161 academic freedom,162 
or government speech.163 Professor Van Alstyne has written and 
spoken extensively on all these issues. One could fill a book, for 
example, commenting and reflecting on his remarkable contributions 
 
 160. See generally  Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 276 (1988) (sustaining 
the power of school authorities to discipline a student for material in a high school newspaper); 
Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986) (sustaining the power of school 
authorities to discipline a student for sexually suggestive remarks made at a school assembly); 
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969) (protecting a student’s 
wearing of a black arm band as a passive symbol of war protest); RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA 
AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH §§ 17:1–17:20 (2004) (collecting and critiquing cases on 
free speech issues in public schools). 
 161. See infra  note 166 and accompanying text. 
 162. See infra  note 164–165 and accompanying text. 
 163. See infra  note 166 and accompanying text. 
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to academic freedom in America,164 contributions reflected in his 
scholarship, his efforts as a litigator, his towering national leadership 
in the American Association of University Professors, and in his day-
to-day commitment to academic freedom at Duke and at the many 
other campuses around the nation at which he has graced faculties.165 
Professor Van Alstyne ’s newest challenge is to take on the fast-
developing issue of “government speech.”166 This effort, a work in 
 
 164. See generally  William W. Van Alstyne, Academic Freedom and the First Amendment in 
the Supreme Court of the United States: An Unhurried Historical Review, 53 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 79 (Summer 1990); William W. Van Alstyne, Foreword to Freedom and Tenure in the 
Academy: The Fiftieth Anniversary of the 1940 Statement of Principles, 53 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 1 (Summer 1990); William W. Van Alstyne, Political Speakers at State Universities: Some 
Constitutional Considerations, 111 U. PA. L. REV. 328 (1963) [hereinafter Van Alstyne, Political 
Speakers]; William W. Van Alstyne, The Specific Theory of Academic Freedom and the General 
Issue of Civil Liberty , 404 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 140 (1972), reprinted in THE 
CONCEPT OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM 59 (Edmund L. Pincoffs ed., 1975) [hereinafter Van 
Alstyne, Specific Theory ]. 
 165. Professor Van Alstyne’s work in the arena of academic freedom and the role of the 
Constitution on campus has influenced the thinking of Justices of the Supreme Court. See 
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 279 n.2 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“Although these 
comments were not directed at a public university’s concern with extracurricular activities, it is 
clear that the ‘atmosphere’ of a university includes such a critical aspect of campus life.” (citing 
Van Alstyne, Specific Theory, supra note 164, at 77–81)); Police Dep’t v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 
& n.3 (1972) (noting the intersection of equal protection and First Amendment 
antidiscrimination principles (citing  Van Alstyne, Political Speakers, supra  note 164)); Jones v. 
State Bd. of Educ., 397 U.S. 31, 34 (1970) (per curiam) (Douglas, J., dissenting): 
But the campus, where this leaflet was distributed, is a fitting place for the 
dissemination of a wide spectrum of ideas.  
Moreover, it is far too late to suggest that since attendance at a state university is a 
‘privilege,’ not a ‘right,’ there are no constitutional barriers to summary withdrawal of 
the ‘privilege.’ 
(citing Van Alstyne, Right-Privilege Distinction, supra note 21, at 1445–54); Note, Academic 
Freedom and Federal Regulation of University Hiring, 92 HARV. L. REV. 879 (1979); Comment, 
Another Look at Unconstitutional Conditions, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 144 (1968).  
 166. Cases in which the government is the funder of the speech, or is itself the speaker, 
present one of the most rapidly developing arenas in which this process continues to unfold. See, 
e.g., Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 233 (2000) (upholding a 
university’s use of student fees to support extracurricular speech activities by students, provided 
the fees are administered with viewpoint neutrality); Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 481, 484 
(1987) (allowing Congress to place the term “political propaganda” upon expressive materials 
from foreign countries intended to influence U.S. foreign policy); Planned Parenthood of S.C. v. 
Rose, 361 F.3d 786, 799 (4th Cir. 2004) (striking down South Carolina’s “Choose Life” specialty 
license plate because it only opened a limited forum to one viewpoint, thereby favoring that 
viewpoint, without the State having identified itself as the speaker); Sons of Confederate 
Veterans, Inc. ex rel. Griffin v. Comm’r of Va. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 288 F.3d 610, 618–21, 
626 (4th Cir. 2002) (applying a four-factor test to determine that logos incorporating the 
Confederate flag on specialty license plates concern private speech, not government speech, and 
striking down a restriction on such logos as unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination). 
Government may put its resources behind one policy (pro-life) but not another (the provision of 
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progress in the Spring of 2005, is being undertaken by Professor Van 
Alstyne as this essay and this symposium tribute to his scholarship 
were being completed. I have been lucky enough to have been given a 
sneak preview of the problems that he is tackling, and, along with the 
others who so admire his scholarship, I cannot wait to see what he 
does with it. And so retrospective here gives way to prospective. 
Perhaps there is no more apt tribute to William Van Alstyne the 
teacher and scholar than the observation that we all continue to 
anticipate his work.  
CONCLUSION 
William Van Alstyne, the greatest intellectual provocateur in my 
life in the law, has through his extraordinary insights into these 
conundrums cajoled and confounded my own thinking on freedom of 
speech for over two decades. His ruminations and variations on the 
constitutional text and history, his ringing chord changes on 
approaches to constitutional interpretation, his pioneering 
exploration of the distinction between “rights” and “privileges,” and 
his graphic elaborations on the wide variety of approaches that courts 
and commentators have invoked to try to organize and render 
coherent free speech law, have been at once a wonderful guide and a 
vexing challenge to anyone who has ventured into this arena. 
I could go on and on exploring  the pervasive influence of 
William Van Alstyne’s thought on the evolution of First Amendment 
 
information concerning abortion services), provided it does not engage in viewpoint 
discrimination; government may not place restrictions on the dispensing of largess by private 
speakers in a manner that discriminates on the basis of viewpoint. Government may, however, 
when it is itself engaged in speech, express its own viewpoint (to the disparagement of others) 
without triggering any significant First Amendment judicial review whatsoever. Compare Rust 
v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193–94 (1991) (asserting that “[t]he Government can, without violating 
the Constitution, selectively fund a program to encourage certain activities it believes to be in 
the public interest,” and that “when the Government appropriates public funds to establish a 
program it is entitled to define the limits of that program”), with Rosenberger v. Rector & 
Visitors of the  Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833–34 (1995) (recognizing that the Court has 
“permitted the government to regulate the content of what is or is not expressed when it is the 
speaker or when it enlists private entities to convey its own message,” but refusing to extend 
that authority when the government “discriminate[s] based on the viewpoint of private persons 
whose speech it facilitates”), and Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wisc. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 
at 235 (stating that “[w]hen the government speaks . . . it is . . . accountable to the electorate and 
the political process for its advocacy,” but noting that the university was not speaking here). A 
critical question, now being addressed by Professor Van Alstyne in his forthcoming efforts, is 
whether there are limits imposed by the First Amendment on even the government’s own 
expression. 
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doctrine and theory, as one might for virtually any arena of 
constitutional law. The reflections here only scratch the surface. As 
lawyers, scholars, and citizens, we owe Professor Van Alstyne a great 
deal for his courage and honesty as a teacher, scholar, leader, and 
advocate. 
For me, it is also more personal. The intellectual excitement and 
passionate commitment with which he approached the world of 
constitutional law caught fire in me on the first day of class with him. 
That excitement, commitment, and passion have fired my 
professional life ever since. 
I will always be indebted to William Van Alstyne for that 
inspiration. It is the kind of debt that the student never really repays 
to the teacher, except to the extent that the student may also learn to 
teach, and, in so doing, seek to inspire others. My life as a lawyer and 
scholar was forever influenced by Professor Van Alstyne, and I know 
of no other way to thank him than to continue to labor to pass on to 
new generations of students some measure of the passion and zeal for 
our wonderful Constitution that he so indelibly instilled in me. 
